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SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING MOTIONS UNDER
FEDERAL RULE 12(b)
By CLAUDE H. BROWN*
I. Is MOTION TO DISMISS THE ONLY MOTION UNDER
RULE 12(b) ?
R ULE 12(b) permits the assertion of six defenses either in the
responsive pleading or by motion, at the option of the pleader.
The name of the motion or motions is not specified. It is clear that
the proper one is a motion to dismiss if the defense is "(1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter," "(3) improper venue," or
"(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
Motion to dismiss is the remedy for "(2) lack of jurisdiction over
the person" if there is no diversity of citizenship between plaintiff
and defendant, when that is the basis of asserted federal jurisdic-
tion, because in that situation the federal court would lack juris-
diction over the subject matter under subdivision (1).
But suppose the defense is that the summons (subdivision 4
of Rule 12(b) ), service of summons (subdivision 5), or the re-
turn of service of summons, is insufficient. Is the proper motion
a motion to dismiss or is it a motion to quash (or to vacate, or
set aside) the summons, the service or return of service?
The effect of a fatally defective summons' or insufficient service
should not be a dismissal of the action because the filing of the
*Visiting Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law.
'Rule 4(h) permits amendment, in the court's discretion, of process or
proof of service "unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would
result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process is-
sued."
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complaint, not the service of summons, commences the action.2
Upon request of the plaintiff another summons can be issued
by the clerk.3 Another summons would be necessary if it were
so defective as not to be amendable but would not be required if
only the service or return of service were defective. In several
cases the courts have assumed without discussion of the point
that a motion to quash is the proper remedy to attack a fatally
defective summons or service. 4 However, one district court has
said that a motion to quash can not be used and that a motion to
dismiss is the only remedy. In Smith v. Bemnore,5 an action
arising out of an automobile collision, service was made by delivery
of the summons to the secretary of state pursuant to a statute
authorizing this method of service on non-resident motorists in-
volved in automobile collisions in the state. Certain defendants
filed a motion to quash for insufficiency of process because of the
failure of the plaintiff to comply with the statutory requirement
for mailing notice of service by registered mail and filing an
affidavit concerning such service and notice, together with the
return receipt. In discussing the motion to quash the court said:
"Under the new Rules of Civil Procedure, .... the motion to dis-
miss on the ground of insufficiency of process is the proper pro-
cedure."6  Apparently, the only reason why the court did not
dismiss the action was the erroneous holding that the defect in
service was waived by joining with the motion to quash a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.7 In Smith v. Behnore there
2Rule 3. Prior to the new Rules of Civil Procedure, quashing service
of process because defendant was not then within the territorial jurisdiction
did not require dismissal of the action if the court had jurisdiction over
the subject matter. In re Employers Reinsurance Corp., (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1936) 82 F. (2d) 373, aff'd Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, (1937)
299 U. S. 374, 57 S. Ct. 273, 81 L. Ed. 289.
3Rule 4(a).
4Schwarz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1940) 110 F.(2d) 465; Cannon v. Time, Inc., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 423;
Molesphini v. Bruno, (E.D.N.Y. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 595; International
Moulders Union of North America v. National Labor Relations Board,
(E.D.Pa. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 423; Johnson & Gould v. Joseph Schlitz Brew-
ing Co., (E.D. Tenn. 1939) 28 F. Supp.,650; Ross v. Irvine, (VWI.D.Wash.
1939) 28 F. Supp. 983; Hensley v. Green, (W.D.S.C. 1940) 36 F. Supp.
671; Sweeney v. Greenwood Index-Journal Co., (W.D.S.C. 1941) 37 F.
Supp. 484; Cohan v. American Window Glass Co., (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 41 F.
Supp. 48, aff'd as modified, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 111.5 (E.D.Wash. 1941) 1 F. R. D. 633.
6Id. at 634.
7Rule 12(b): "... No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or
motion." 1 Moore, Federal Practice, (1938) sec. 12.09; Note, (1942) 28
Va. L. Rev. 410.
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was jurisdiction over the subject matter and there could be juris-
diction over the person if service of summons were sufficient. In
such situation the action should not be dismissed; the plaintiff
should not be thus placed in the position of having to commence
the action anew and thereby being compelled to pay additional
filing and service fees, and perhaps in the fatal situation of being
unable to maintain another action because of the running of the
statute of limitations.' In a case involving a similar state statute
concerning service of summons on non-resident motorists, another
district court came to the opposite and correct conclusion that the
proper remedy is a motion to quash the return of service."
Form 19 in the Appendix of Forms attached to the Rules con-
templates the use of a motion to quash in a proper case. Para-
graph two of this form states:
"To dismiss the action or in lieu thereof to quash the return
of service of summons on the grounds (a) that the defendant is
a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and was not
and is not subject to service of process within the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, and (b) that the defendant has not been
properly served with process in this action, all of which more
clearly appears in the affidavits of M.N. and X.Y. hereto annexed
as Exhibit A and Exhibit B, respectively."
Part (a) is ground for dismissal for want of jurisdiction of
the court, but part (b) is ground only for quashing the return
of service of summons because of improper service.10 Not only
may affidavits be used in support of the motion to quash,1 but also
Rule 43(e) provides that ". . . the court may direct that the matter
be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions."
Where there is a defective attachment or garnishment, motion
to quash the writ or the return, depending upon which is defective,
'Concerning the problem whether the time of tolling of the statute of
limitations is substantive or procedural under Rule 3, see Commentary,
(1941) 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 884.
t'Molesphini v. Bruno, (E.D.N.Y. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 595. The same
result was reached prior to the new rules. In re Employers Reinsurance
Corporation, supra note 2.
',The alternative motions of Form 19 were used by defendants' attor-
neys in Welty v. Clute, (N.D.N.Y. 1939) 1 F. R. D. 107, and Sweeney v.
Greenwood Index-Journal Co., (W.D.S.C. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 484. Prior
to the new rules it was the practice in federal courts to dispose of objec-
tions to sufficiency of service on a motion to quash the service, or return
of service, supported by affidavits. Higham v. Iowa State Travelers' Assoc.,
(D.C. Mo. 1911) 183 Fed. 845; Wall v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1899) 95 Fed. 398; Thompson v. Terminal Shares, (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 652, cer. den., Guaranty Trust Co. v. Thompson,(1937) 302 U. S. 735, 58 S. Ct. 121, 82 L. Ed. 568.
"
1 Cases collected in note 42, infra.
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would appear to be the proper remedy if the court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action;"- certainly the action should
not be dismissed.
A few courts appear to have been so intrigued by the motion
to dismiss tinder Rule 12(b) (6) that they have assumed that if
an answer, or part of an answer, does not constitute a defense, the
remedy is by motion to dismiss. 3 Of course, subdivision 6 of Rule
12(b) concerns "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted ;" it says nothing about failure to state a defense. If the
entire answer to a claim is defective the remedy is a motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).14 An alternative
remedy is a motion for summary judgment." If one of several
defenses to a claim is defective there could be no judgment on the
pleadings because fact questions are raised by the other sufficient
defenses and the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to judgment.
There is no provision in the rules expressly stating the method
of attacking an insufficient defense which is accompanied by an
adequate defense. Nevertheless, the words "redundant, immaterial,
impertinent" in Rule 12(f), authorizing a motion to strike, are
sufficient to include a purported defense which does not constitute
a defense.16 Several courts have held that a motion to strike is
the proper remedy in that situation.7 Of course, here as elsewhere
"1-fotions to quash writs of attachment and garnishment were used in
federal courts prior to the new rules. See Davis v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L.
Ry. Co., (1909) 217 U. S. 157, 30 S. Ct. 463, 54 L. Ed. 708.
13Dysart v. Remington Rand, Inc., (D.C.Conn. 1939) 31 F. Supp. 296;
Hartford-Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 6 Fed. Rules Serv. 12b.51,
case 3 (W.D.Pa. 1942) ; Colan v. Wecksler, 6 Fed. Rules Serv. 12b.51, case
2 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (plaintiff "moved for an order striking from defend-
ant's answer two affirmative defenses upon the ground that they were in-
sufficient in law and do not constitute defenses to the action. Under Rule
12b . . . a motion of this nature is one to dismiss the defenses and the court
will consider it such;" cf. Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Renken, (E.D.S.C.
1940) 34 F. Supp. 678 (says either rule 12(b) or 12(f) is applicable).
"Cf. Simkins, Federal Practice, (1938) 277, to the effect that motion
to strike also would be proper; Gunder v. New York Times Co., (S.D.
N.Y. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 911.
15Rule 56(a).
161 Moore, Federal Practice, (1938) sec. 12.08; Simkins, Federal Prac-
tice, (1938) 277; Montgomery, Changes in Federal Practice, (1940) 1 F. R.
D. 377, 345.
"7Abruzzino v. The National Fire Ins. Co., (N.D.W.Va. 1939) 26 F.
Supp. 934; Marcus v. Hinck, (S.D.N.Y. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 945; Nordman
v. Johnson City, 1 Fed. Rules Serv. 12f.21, case 1 (E.D. Ill. 1939) ; Teiger
v. Stephen Oderwald, (S.D.N.Y. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 626; Richardson v.
North American Clay Co., (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 12b.22,
case 1; other cases are cited in 1 Moore, Federal Practice, (1938) 630,
note 21 in supplement. In Molesphini v. Bruno. (E.D.N.Y. 1939) 26 F.
Supp. 595, the court sustained a motion to strike a jurisdictional defense
because it had been raised by motion to quash so that defendant could raise
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under the rules, a misnomer of the document should not be fatal;
the court should treat the motion as if it were correctly labeled
when it points out an objectionable defect.
II. MOTION TO DisMIss COMPLAINT WHICH SHOWS
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense must
be set forth affirmatively in a responsive pleading under Rule 8(c).
But if the pleading alleging a claim shows on its face the existence
of an affirmative defense and does not negative such defense, can
the pleading be successfully attacked by a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6) ?
At common law the general issue in an action on the case' 8 and
in assumpsit 5 allowed the defendant to prove almost any matter
of defense in contravention of the plaintiff's right of action even
though such matter was wholly consistent with the allegations in
the declaration and constituted what is now considered new matter
-such as release, accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
and res adjudicata.20 This common law rule enabled the defendant
to take the plaintiff by surprise. Hence, the Hilary Rules of 183421
limited the scope of the general issue in certain actions: especially,
in assumpsit the general issue was confined to a denial of the con-
tract and in action on the case the general issue was limited to
a denial of the wrongful act.2 2 The sole purpose of Federal Rule
8 (c), requiring matter of avoidance or affirmative defense to be
the question on appeal. United States v. Hoover, (W.D. Ky. 1939) 28 F.
Supp. 556, held that a motion to strike the answer and a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings should be treated solely as a motion to strike so
that if the motion is granted defendant may have an opportunity to amend.
But he could be given the privilege of amending upon the sustaining of
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, just as the plaintiff is usually per-
mitted to amend upon the sustaining of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. All pertinent motions are subject to the liberal amendment
provision of Rule 15: "... and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires."
"sShipman, Common Law Pleading, (3d ed. 1923) 312; Newton v.
Creswick, (1687) 3 'Mod. 165, 87 Eng. Rep. 107.
TShipman, Common Law Pleading, (3d ed. 1923) 326-327; Young v.
Rummell, (1842) 2 Hill 478, 15 N. Y. Com. L. Rep. 426, 38 Am. Dec. 594;
Falconer v. Smith, (1851) 18 Pa. St. 130, 55 Am. Dec. 611.
2,A few affirmative matters could not be proved under the general
issue-statute of limitations, discharge in bankruptcy, truth in defamation.
Shipman, Common Law Pleading, (3d ed. 1923) 326; see Young v. Rum-
mell, (1842) 2 Hill 478, 15 N. Y. Com. L. Rep. 426, 38 Am. Dec. 594; Un-
derwood v. Parks, (1743) 2 Strange 200, 93 Eng. Rep. 1127.
215 Barn. & Adol. vii, promulgated under statute of 3 and 4 Win. IV
c. 24.
-"-Shipman, Common Law Pleading, (3d ed. 1923) 335.
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pleaded affirmatively, is the same as the purpose of the Hilary
Rules-viz., to preclude the defendant from taking the plaintiff
by surprise by raising at the trial, under the general issue at com-
mon law and under a general denial under Rule 8(b), one or
more of the many affirmative defenses without advance notice to
the plaintiff.
Suppose the plaintiff alleges facts which show that the de-
fendant has an affirmative defense but the complaint does not
negative that defense by alleging other facts. Certainly the com-
plaint shows that he has no "claim upon which relief can be
granted." Is the pleading subject to successful attack by demurrer
at common law, in equity, under code pleading, and by motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b) (6)? The strict common
law rule, followed by some courts under code pleading, was that
the allegation anticipating the affirmative defense is not only un-
necessary, but also improper and therefore to be treated as im-
material and not demurrable. 23 The equity courts and many
courts under code pleading took the view that although the allega-
tion was unnecessary, it was not improper and could be con-
sidered a material part of the pleading, which was therefore de-
murrable. -2 4 The latter view is more in harmony with the object
of pleading under the code and Federal Rules to give adequate
notice to the opposite party and to the court of the pleader's case,
and "it would seem that, the earlier the pleader more completely
sets forth his position, the more the pleading objective has been
obtained."2
As previously stated, the only purpose of Rule 8(c) is to pre-
clude the defendant from raising by general denial under Rule
8(b) matters of avoidance and thus to prevent the defendant from
taking the plaintiff by surprise. When the plaintiff pleads facts
showing an affirmative defense he can not be taken by surprise
and his pleading shows that he has no cause of action. Therefore
23Id. at 510; Clark, Code Pleading, (1928) 168, n. 117 cites cases.
24Nitkey v. S. T. McKnight Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d)
916, cer. den. (1937) 301 U. S. 697, 57 S. Ct. 925, 81 L. Ed. 1352, reh. den.
(1937) 302 U. S. 773, 58 S. Ct. 5, 82 L. Ed. 599 (bar of statute of limita-
tions appearing on face of bill of equity could be raised as a defense by
motion to dismiss) ; Young v. Southern Pacific Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1929)
34 F. (2d) 135, cer. den. 280 U. S. 597, 50 S. Ct. 68, 74 L. Ed. 643 (laches
shown on face of complaint may be considered on motion to dismiss) ; Mc-
Mullen v. Lewis, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 481, cer. den. 280 U. S.
566, 50 S. Ct. 26, 74 L. Ed. 620 (laches shown in complaint subject to
motion to dismiss). Clark, Code Pleading, (1928) 169, n. 118 cites other
cases.
25d. at 169.
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a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) should be sustained.
Some courts have generalized that a motion to dismiss is not the
proper remedy but in the cases containing such statements it does
not appear whether or not the complaint alleged an affirmative
defense.2' But there are several cases which hold that when the
complaint shows the existence of an affirmative defense, a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a proper remedy. -7
There were additional reasons given for not permitting the de-
fendant to raise the statute of limitations by demurrer.28 Few cases
considered the first reason, that the bar of the statute does not ap-
pear on the face of the pleading 29-probably because of the rule
that a court will take judicial notice of the date of commencement
of the action as a part of the record of the case then before the
court."' The second reason was that allegations of time were not
material, with certain exceptions, since the plaintiff is not obliged
to prove the dates as alleged. 31 The third reason was that plain-
tiff should have an opportunity to show some exception which
might prevent the bar of the statute from operating.3 2 In a stat-
utory cause of action containing a special limitation, the limita-
tion was considered part of the cause of action, the right as well
as the remedy being barred, so that a demurrer could raise the
defense. :" The majority of code pleading states have held that a
2"Piest v. Tide Water Oil Co., (S.D.N.Y. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 1020
(statute of frauds) ; Sechers v. Cardella, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 12b.334, case 3
(N.D. Ohio 1941) (laches) ; Sproul v. Gambone, (W.D.Pa. 1940) 34 F.
Supp. 441, 442 (pcndency of another action). It is clear that a motion to
stay, as contrasted with abatement, pending disposition of a connected case
is a proper remedy. Green v. Gravatt, (W.D.Pa. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 491;
Butler v. judge of United States District Court, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1941)
116 F. (2d) 1013. Cases containing like dicta concerning the statute of
limitations are cited in note 36, infra.
'-
7Kahn v. Cecelia Co., (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 878 (statute of
frauds) ; Barnhart v. Western 'Maryland Ry. Co., 5 Fed. Rules Serv.
12b.325, case 4 (D.C.Md. 1941) (laches). Several cases to the same effect
involving statutes of limitations are cited in note 37, infra.
;'This problem under common law and code pleading has been exten-
sively discussed by Professor Thomas E. Atkinson, Pleading the Statute
of Limitations, (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 914, 918-933.
"!,Cases are collected in Atkinson, supra note 28, p. 919, n. 19.
-"9 Wigmore, Evidence, (3d ed. 1940) sec. 2579; cases cited in Atkinson,
supra note 28, p. 920, n. 26.
31Note, (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 491.
"-'Atkinson, supra note 28, p. 921, n. 35.
'":Atkinson, supra note 28, p. 926-927. Typical of such statutes are those
permitting civil actions for wrongful death; and the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. Morrison v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1913) 40 App. D. C.
391, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1026; Bell v. Wabash Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1932)
58 F. (2d) 569; Callahan v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., (E.D.Ky. 1941) 40
F. Supp. 323 (motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) sustained).
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demurrer or motion to dismiss will raise the statute of limitations
if the complaint shows that the statutory period has run.34
The purpose of Rule 9(f) was to make certain that a motion
to dismiss could be used to present the issue of the statute of
limitations when the complaint shows that the statute has run.2i
Rule 9(f) provides: "For the purpose of testing the sufficiency
of a pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall
be considered like all other averments of material matter." This
disposes of the principal reason for the common law rule. As
previously indicated, the first reason was disregarded by most
courts. The third reason is disposed of by the liberal amendment
provisions of Rule 15; it is no burden on the plaintiff to require
him, if his complaint shows that under the general provisions of
the statute of limitations his claim is barred, to plead facts which
place his case within some exception preventing the bar of the
statute.
Some opinions have contained statements that the running of
the statute of limitations can not be raised by motion to dismiss
but must be pleaded affirmatively under Rule 8(c) .' But these
opinions do not indicate whether the complaints showed that the
statutory period had run. Of course, if the complaint is silent on
the matter of when the claim arose, a motion to dismiss is not the
propef method of raising the issue, unless it is a "speaking mo-
tion," which is discussed in Part III of this article. There are
several cases which have decided, in accordance with the purpose
of Rule 9(f), that if the complaint shows that the statutory period
has run a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be
granted.37
34Atkinson, supra note 28, p. 924-925; Limitation of Actions, 37 C. J.
sec. 708.
3rJudge Charles E. Clark, Proc. Cleveland Inst., (1938) 234-235; 1
Moore, Federal Practice, (1938) 597; Note, (1940) 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 671,
672.
seBaker v. Sisk, (E.D.Okla. 1938) 1 F. R. D. 232, 236; Holmberg v.
Hannaford, (S.D.Ohio 1939) 28 F. Supp. 216, 219; Dirk Ter Haar v. Sea-
board Oil Co., (S.D.Cal. 1940) 1 F. R. D. 598; Raker v. United States, 3
Fed. Rules Serv. 12b.325, case 1 (W.D.N.Y. 1940); Patsavouras v. Gar-
field, (D.C.N.J. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 406, 407; United States v. Earling, (E.D.
Wis. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 864, 870. Munzer v. Swedish American Line, (S.D.
N.Y. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 789, has been cited for the point that a motion to
dismiss is not the proper remedy, but the complaint alleged also that plain-
tiff was insane so as to cause the statute not to operate, thus alleging facts
to negative the affirmative defense.
37Sproul v. Gambone, (W.D.Pa. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 441; Wright v.
Bankers Service Corp., (S.D.Cal. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 980; Wilson v. Shores-
Mueller Co., (N.D.Iowa 1941) 40 F. Supp. 729; Cramer v. Aluminum
Cooking Utensil Co., 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 12b.325, case 4 (W.D.Pa. 1941) ;
Barnhart v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 12b.325, case
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III. SPEAKING MOTION TO DismIss
The common law and code pleading rule prohibits a "speaking
demurrer," i.e., nothing outside the attacked pleading may be con-
sidered in determining its sufficiency to state a cause of action.38
Likewise, under the superseded Federal Equity Rule 29 there
could be no "speaking motion to dismiss."-"9 Is the movant
under Rule 12(b) confined to the contents of the pleading 0 al-
leging the claim,4' or can the motion be supported by other por-
tions of the record, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and de-
positions ?
It is obvious that the movement is not confined to the contents
of the pleading alleging the claim if the motion raises issues under
subdivisions 1 to 5 of Rule 12(b)-questions of jurisdiction,
venue and process."2 Rule 43(e) permits the use of such evi-
4 (D.C.AMd. 1941); Pearson v. O'Connor, 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 12b.325, case
5 (D. of C. 1942); Abram v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 6 Fed. Rules
Serv. 12b.325, case 1 (S.D.Cal. 1942) ; see Leimer v. State Mutual Life
Assurance Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940) 108 F. (2d) 303, 305-306; A. G.
Reeves Construction Co. v. Weiss, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1941) 119 F. (2d) 472;
Stoddard v. Morrin, 6 Fed. Rules Serv. 12b.33, case 1 (D. of C. 1942).
3,Clark, Code Pleading, (1928) 353.
• "Polk Co. v. Glover, (1938) 305 U. S. 5, 59 S. Ct. 15, 83 L. Ed. 6;
1 Moore, Federal Practice, (1938) sec. 12.02, citing several cases at 632 n.
6.
' "A bill of particulars and a more definite statement are part of the
pleadings which they supplement. Rule 12(e) ; Reilly v. Wolcott, (S.D.N.Y.
1939) 1 F. R. D. 103; Sheehan v. Municipal Light & Power Co., (S.D.N.Y.
1940) 1 F. R. D. 256; Kentucky-Tennessee Light & P. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., (W.D. Ky. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 728. An exhibit is part of the
pleading. Rule 10(c) ; Deward & Rich v. Bristol Savings & Loan Corp.,
(W.D.Va. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 777; Tahir Erk v. Glenn L. Martin Co., (D.C.
Md. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 722.
41Claims may be alleged in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, and
third-party complaint. Rule 7(a).4 2Central Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1940)
116 F. (2d) 85 (lack of jurisdiction) ; Cohen v. American Window Glass
Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 111 (lack of jurisdiction to inter-
fere with internal management of foreign corporation) ; Watters v. Ralston
Coal Co., (M.D.Pa. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 387 (jurisdictional question; de-
positions ordered to be taken on question of plantiff's citizenship) ; Nielson
v. Farley, (S.D.N.Y. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 948 (lack of jurisdiction over per-
son); Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Alemite Co., (D.C.N.D. 1939) 28 F. Supp.
385 (jurisdictional question; order permitting depositions to be taken);
Starns v. Success Portrait Co., (E.D.Tenn. 1940) 1 F. R. D. 503 (lack of
jurisdictional amount) ; Ellis v. Stevens, (D.C.Mass. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 488
(lack of jurisdiction over subject matter) ; Calhoun v. Lange, (D.C.Md.
1941) 40 F. Supp. 264 (lack of jurisdictional amount) ; see Kentucky-
Tennessee Light & P. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., (W.D.Ky. 1941) 37 F.
Supp. 728, 736; Pike, Some Recent Trends under the Federal Rules, (1941)
9 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 26, 35; contra, Dunleer Co. v. Minter Homes Corp.,
(S.D.W.Va. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 242 (plaintiff's answers to interrogatories
not considered on motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in determining
amount involved). But even prior to the new rules a motion to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction reciting facts delors the complaint was 1)rotner. KVOS
v. Associated Press, (1936) 299 U. S. 269, 57 S. Ct. 197, 81 L. Ed. 183.
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dence: "When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record
the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the re-
spective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard
wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions."' 3 The defenses
under subdivisions 1 to 5 of Rule 12(b) are of such a nature that
they seldom appear in pleadings alleging claims so that the evi-
dence authorized by Rule 43(e) usually must be presented in sup-
port of motions raising questions of jurisdiction, venue and
process.
A more difficult problem is the question whether a motion
under subdivision 6 of Rule 12(b) to dismiss for "failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted" must be confined to the
averments of the pleading alleging a claim, or whether affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or other matter of record
may support the motion.
The arguments which have been made for confining a motion
under subdivision 6 to the face of the complaint or other pleading
alleging a claim are: that "failure to state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted" means failure of the person attempting to
allege a claim to state (i.e., allege) a claim, not failure to have a
claim; that subdivision 6 is merely the successor of the demurrer
at law and the motion to dismiss in equity; that Rule 8(c) re-
quires affirmative defenses to be pleaded; that the use of affidavits,
depositions, and other matters of record, in support of the motion
would "practically eliminate" Rule 8(c) and Rule 56(b), which
permits a defending party to move for a summary judgment sup-
ported by affidavits or depositions or other parts of the record.4'
A less plausible reason has been advanced-that the use of such
evidence in support of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim would permit a "battle of affidavits. ' 45 This result does not
follow. 46 A summary judgment is permitted only if "except as to
43Cases collected in note 42, supra. Rule 6(d) provides: ". . . When a
motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the mo-
tion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits
may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court per-
mits them to be served at some other time."
44The most forceful presentations of these arguments have been made
by Judge Eugene Rice in Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., (E.D.Okla.
1940) 35 F. Supp. 296; Judge George Donworth, member of the Advisory
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Proc. of N. Y. Institute, (1938)
300-302; and in Note, (1941) 30 Cal. L. Rev. 92.
45Note, (1941) 30 Cal. L. Rev. 92, 95-96; Kentucky-Tennessee Light
& P. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., (W.D.Ky. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 728, 737.
'6In Massaro v. Fisk Rubber Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 382,
383, it is said: ". . . so far as they (affidavits) supplement the allegations of
the complaint and do not present any issue of fact, I deem it proper, in deter-
mining the validity of plaintiff's claim, to consider not only the complaint but
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the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any ma-
terial fact and.., the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.' '1 7 A less strict requirement would not be expected
under a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. And the
privilege of a jury trial, if demanded, would preclude a "battle of
affidavits" on such motion.
The arguments which have been made in support of the per-
missibility of a speaking motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim are: Rule 12(b) says "every defense in law or fact" under
subdivisions 1 to 6 may be raised either in the answer or by mo-
tion, whereas former Equity Rule 29, under which speaking mo-
tions were not allowed, 48 permitted a motion to dismiss to raise
only defenses "in point of law arising upon the face of the bill;"
subdivision (b) of Rule 12 makes no distinction between defenses
1 to 5 and defense 6; and Rules 43(e) and 6(d) expressly au-
thorize affidavits to support a motion.4" Judge Charles E. Clark,
Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Pro-
cedure, has said concerning the contention that there can be no
extraneous evidence in support of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b) (6), "This conclusion appears to be contrary to the provi-
sions of Rules 6(d) and 43(e), authorizing the use of affidavits;
and since the summary judgment, rule, 56, clearly is contra, such
a holding makes small differences of form and nomenclature of
motions of perhaps decisive significance. Moreover, it is opposed
to the spirit of the rules. . ., for it requires decision upon the basis
of the formal papers before the court, and not upon what counsel
show to be the real issues."50
the facts disclosed in the affidavits." In Gallup v. Caldwell, (C.C.A. 3d Cir.
1941) 120 F. (2d) 90, 93, concerning its decision that a speaking motion
to dismiss was proper, the court said: "In so holding, we do not indicate
that disputed questions of fact involved in the merits of claim or defense
may necessarily be fought out as preliminary issues raised on motions. The
affidavits filed by the parties have raised no fact controversy, but a question
of law. No problem arising out of a possible claim to jury trial is involved."
In Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 124 F.
(2d) 822, holding that affidavits may be employed, it was pointed out(p. 823) that no material issues of fact were raised. Of course, there may
be a "battle of affidavits" on the preliminary fact question in a class action
under Rule 23 whether plaintiffs adequately represent the class. Weeks v.
Bareco Oil Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 84, 93.47Rule 56(c).4NPolk Co. v. Glover, (1938) 305 U. S. 5, 59 S. Ct. 15, 83 L. Ed. 6;
1 'Moore, Federal Practice, (1938) sec. 12.02, citing several cases at p. 632,
note 6.
011 Moore, Federal Practice, (1938) 645-647; Alabama Independent
Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., (N.D.Ala. 1939) 28 F.
Supp. 386, 389.
z'Clark, Simplified Pleading, Judicial Administration Monograph Series
A, No. 18, (1942) 18; Ser. A collected, at pp. 110-111; 2 F. R. D. 456, 466;
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The cases are quite evenly divided on this problem.5 1 Nor do
the writers on the subject agree.5 2 The trend can be said to be
6 Fed. Rules Serv. L. R. No. 57 at 11; also in (1942) 27 Ia. L. Rev. 272,
283-288. Judge Clark's view is elsewhere expressed in The Proper Function
of the Supreme Court's Federal Rules Committee, (1942) 28 A. B. A. J.
521, 522; Proc. Wash. Inst. (1938) 74-75; and in Palmer v. Palmer, (D.C.
Conn. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 861, 863.51That a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) is confined to the
pleading alleging a claim: Baker v. Sisk, (E.D.Okla. 1938) 1 F. R. D. 232;
McConville v. District of Columbia, (D. of C. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 295; Sher-
over v. John Wanamaker, (S.D.N.Y. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 650; Eberle v.
Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., (E.D.Okla. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 296; Sarnowski v.
Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 1940) 3 Fed. Rules Serv.
12b.33, case 3; Kentucky-Tennessee Light & P. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
(W.D.Ky. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 728; Kuhn v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of
Calif., (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 102; Hadley v. Rinke, (S.D. N.Y. 1941)
39 F. Supp. 207; Eastman Kodak Co. v. McAuley, (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 41 F.
Supp. 873; Stoddard v. Morrin, (D. of C. 1942) 6 Fed. Rules Serv. 12 b. 33,
case 1; see Mahoney v. Bethlehem Engineering Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1939) 27
F. Supp. 865, 866; Sheehan v. Municipal Light & P. Co., (S.D.N.Y. 1940)
1 F. R. D. 256, 257; Monjar v. Higgins, (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 633,
634; Snowhite v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., (D.C. N.J. 1941) 40 F.
Supp. 739, 741; cf. Ellis v. Stevens, (D.C.Mass. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 488, 490.
That the motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b) (6) is not confined to the
pleading alleging a claim but may be supported by extraneous evidence:
Gallup v. Caldwell, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 90; Boro Hall Corp.
v. General Motors Corp., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 124 F. (2d) 822, affirming
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 999; Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., (C.C.A. 7th
Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 84; Lucking v. Delano, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1942) 129
F. (2d) 283; Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Petro-
leum Corp., (N.D.Ala. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 386; Massaro v. Fisk Rubber
Corp., (D.C.Mass. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 382; Roomberg v. United States,
(E.D.Pa. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 621; see Central Mexico Light & P. Co. v.
Munch, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 85, 87; Cohen v. American
Window Glass Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 111, 114; Victory v.
Manning, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 415; Samara v. United
States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 594, 597; Palmer v. Palmer,
(D.C.Conn. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 861, 863.
Some courts have avoided the problem by stating that they have treated
the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) supported by affidavits or other
extraneous evidence as if it were a motion for summary judgment under
Rule 56(b). Nielson v. Farley, (S.D.N.Y. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 948; Brother-
hood of Sleeping Car Porters v. Pullman Co., (N.D.Ill. 1942) 5 Fed. Rules
Serv. 12b.33, case 8; Weil v. N. J. Richman Co., (S.D.N.Y. 1940) 34 F.
Supp. 401 (but both parties stipulated that it might be so considered).
5Those who take the view that there can be extraneous evidence in
support of the motion: Judge Charles E. Clark, op. cit. supra note 50;
Judge A. M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1939) 25 Va.
L. Rev. 261, 266; 1 Moore, Federal Practice, (1938) 645-647; Roeming,
Speaking Motions under New Federal Rule 12b(6), (1940) 9 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 174.
Those taking the contrary position: Judge George Donworth, member
of the Advisory Committee, Proc. N. Y. Inst. (1938) 300-302; 3 Ohlinger,
Federal Practice, (1939) 168; Simkins, Federal Practice, (3d ed. 1938)
274; Edmunds, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1938) 527; Holtzoff,
New Federal Procedure and the Courts, (1940) 34; Holtzoff. Practice
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1940) 20 B. U. L. Rev. 179,
202; Note, -(1941) 30 Cal. L. Rev. 92.
The authorities are discussed without advocacy of either view in Note,
(1942) 14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 131. A specious middle ground that there
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toward Judge Clark's view that extraneous evidence can be used
to support the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, in
that all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals which have passed on
the matter have so decided.5 3 These decisions are of more recent
date than the District Court cases to the contrary, several of
which District Court decisions are from the Southern District of
New York and therefore have been overruled by the Circuit Court
of Appeals, Second Circuit.5 4
If a speaking motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) is per-
missible, by the same token a speaking motion for judgment on
the pleadings under Rule 12(c) may be used. 55 Certainly if Rule
43(e) is applicable to the former it is also applicable to the latter.
Under the view that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, Rule 12(b) (6), and motion for judgment on the pleadings,
Rule 12(c), may be supported by extraneous evidence, they be-
come substantially the same as the motion for summary judg-
ment, Rule 55(c). But then two practice problems arise: 1. Is it
sufficient that the motion, if supported by extraneous evidence,
and notice of the hearing thereon be served five days before the
time specified for the hearing, Rule 6(d), or must the motion be
served at least ten days before the time specified for the hearing,
Rule 56(c)? If the motion is supported by extraneous evidence
the opposite party should be given the longer period to prepare
his resistance and counter evidence, since the motion becomes sub-
stantially a motion for summary judgment. 2. Does the use of the
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), when overruled, pre-
clude the later use of a motion for summary judgment under Rule
56? The same matters can be presented in each motion and can be
can be a speaking motion to dismiss except as to affirmative matters under
Rule 8(c) has been taken in Note, (1942) 15 So. Cal. L. Rev. 272, 273.
5,"Gallup v. Caldwell, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 90; Boro
Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 124 F. (2d)
822; Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1941) 125 F. (2d) 84;
Lucking v. Delano, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 283; see Central
Mexico Light & P. Co. v. Munch, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 85,
87; Cohen v. American Window Glass Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 126 F.
(2d) 111, 114; Victory v. Manning, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 415;
Samara v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 594, 597; but
cf. Leimer v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940)
108 F. (2d) 302, 305-306.5
'lOver half of the cases holding that a speaking motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b) (6) is not permissible are from the Southern District of
New York (see note 51, supra) and therefore have been overruled by the
contrary decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, cited
in note 53.55United States Trust Co. v. Sears, (D.C.Conn. 1939) 29 F. Supp.
6-13; Palmer v. Palmer, (D.C.Conn. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 861.
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supported by extraneous evidence; but if the motion to dismiss
was based solely on the law question of defective allegations in
the complaint and was not supported by affidavits or other ex-
traneous evidence, it cannot well be contended that the same ques-
tions were raised in both motions. The first motion raised only
the law question whether a claim was alleged; the second raised
law and fact questions on the merits. There is nothing in the
present rules to the effect that the motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim precludes a subsequent motion for summary judg-
ment.
Judge Clark has proposed as a solution of these problems the
elimination of the motions permitted under Rule 12(b) (1-6) and
requiring all defenses or objections to a claim for relief to be as-
serted in the responsive pleading; and the elimination of the mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c)." This
clearly leaves the motion for summary judgment, Rule 56, as the
only device for obtaining the result formerly obtainable by the
three differently named motions. Objection has been made to
Judge Clark's suggested change in Rule 12 by Mr. Alexander
Holtzoff.57 He states that he has not observed any abuses of the
motion to dismiss or any extended use of that remedy for dilatory
purposes; that in an action involving intricate facts the prepara-
tion of an answer may be a laborious task, involving extensive re-
search and study, which might be saved by a favorable ruling on
a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state
a claim. The answer to Mr. Holtzoff's contention would appear
to be that normally it is no laborious task to comply with Rule
8(b): "A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses
to each claim asserted . . . ,'; and that probably the cases are rela-
tively few which are disposed of on motion under Rule 12(b)
(6).5 1s judge Clark's proposal would adequately deal with the
situation by permitting a preliminary hearing "whenever in the
opinion of the court a decision in advance of trial on a defense
or objection may substantially dispose of the whole action or any
distinct part of it. .. ."
56Clark, Simplified Pleading, Judicial Administration Monograph Ser.
A, No. 18, (1942) 24-25; Ser. A Collected, 114-116; (1942) 2 F R. D. 456,
470-471; 6 Fed. Rules Serv. L. R. No. 57 at 15-16.57Holtzoff, Desirability of Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, (1942) 6 Fed. Rules Serv. L. R. No. 60 at 2.
58Pike, Objections to Pleadings under the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, (1937) 47 Yale L. R. 50, 57 note 38: "In a survey of Connecti-
cut cases it was found that in only 25 cases of 363 in which a demurrer was
filed was judgment entered as a result. Clark and Shulman, Law Administra-
tion in Connecticut (1937) 218."
